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Abstract
Artificial intelligence (AI), including machine learning (ML), is widely viewed as
having substantial transformative potential across society, and novel
implementations of these technologies promise new modes of living, working,
and community engagement. Data and the algorithms that operate upon it thus
operate under an expansive ethical valence, bearing consequence to both the
development of these potentially transformative technologies and our under-
standing of how best to manage and support its impact. This paper reports upon
an interview-driven study of stakeholders engaged with technology development,
policy, and law relating to AI. Among our participating stakeholders, unexpected
outcomes and flawed implementations of AI, especially those leading to negative
social consequences, are often attributed to ill-structured, incomplete, or biased
data, and the algorithms and interpretations that might produce negative social
consequence are seen as neutrally representing the data, or otherwise blameless
in that consequence. We propose a more complex infrastructural view of the
tools, data, and operation of AI systems as necessary to the production of social
good, and explore how representations of the successes and failures of these sys-
tems, even among experts, tend to valorize algorithmic analysis and locate fault
at the quality of the data rather than the implementation of systems.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
How does a good system go bad? Popular media contain a
variety of accounts of the successes and failures of Artifi-
cial Intelligence (AI)-based systems, as well as a set of nar-
ratives as to how these systems produce either successes or
failures. Image recognition systems are lauded for their
ability to parse x-rays more effectively than trained
doctors, and question-answering systems compete on Jeop-
ardy. Alongside these successes are disturbing evidence of
racist prison sentencing and medical prioritizing algo-
rithms, and discriminatory hiring algorithms. In many of
these cases, the hype of the system is placed at the algo-
rithm, the ever black-boxed, unknowable learning system,
where the failures are placed at the data as incomplete, ill-
structured, or biased in its representation.
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AI has developed over several decades and is now a
prominent and mature field of scholarship (Stone
et al., 2016). Symbolic AI focusing on the representation
and use of domain knowledge was an early area of AI
research (Ribes et al., 2019). Much recent innovation has
been in the domain of statistical machine learning, includ-
ing deep learning approaches using artificial neural net-
works, including applications in domains such as natural
language processing, computer vision, and robotics (Stone
et al., 2016). Modern AI is particularly reliant on engage-
ment with large data sets, processed and weighted with
some level of autonomy, and delivering probabilistic,
rather than deterministic, results.
The ethical, policy, and legal concerns of AI are not
yet well-defined. The variety and quantity of data as well
as the often-counterintuitive outputs of algorithmically
driven analysis make it significantly more difficult to pre-
dict harms. The data used to support AI is drawn from a
large number of sources, including from people who may
not even be aware that the data is being collected for that
purpose. However, the conclusions derived from the
application of AI to this heterogenous data often have the
weight of knowledge without significant accounts of their
uncertainty. One key challenge in this domain are issues
arising from attempts to understand and assert the
accountability of “black-boxed” analytic techniques
(Fleischmann & Wallace, 2005, 2009)—particularly when
the outcomes of research conducted using those tech-
niques are used to inform policy, direct resources, and
respond to emergency situations (Lehr & Ohm, 2017).
Popular accounts of AI successes and failures are not
without discursive power. It is often difficult to discuss
‘bad’ AI without thinking of HAL, Skynet, or other similar
media representations of AI gone wrong (in fact, these
popular portrayals were often referenced by our interview
subjects when they were asked about potential negative
consequences of AI). Similarly, positive popular accounts
of AI often fail to account for the flaws and limitations of
these systems or otherwise do not transparently represent
their operation or scope. Kranzberg's (1986) First Law of
Technology holds, “technology is neither good nor bad,
nor is it neutral” (p. 547). The extreme examples of over-
hyping the positive or negative implications of AI fall into
the camps of viewing AI as purely good or bad. However,
it is also important to note that AI is not neutral, some AI
systems have some good implications and some bad impli-
cations for different members of a given society or across
societies. Thus, the challenge comes in determining which
factors influence the “goodness” or “badness” of AI.
One common scapegoat for bad AI is bad data. Modern
AI is characterized by its relationship to, and reliance
upon, broad, heterogeneous regimes of data collection and
analysis. Algorithmic analysis provides tools to deal with
and analyze increasingly broad and heterogeneous data
sources towards a variety of potential societal outputs.
The role of government, for example, in managing the
deviations in stock prices emerging from the practice of
algorithmic trading, particularly when that trading is
international in scope (Brogaard, Hendershott & Riordan,
2017; Cartea, Donnelly, & Jaimungal, 2017; Chaboud &
Chiquoine, 2014). Under the reality of imminent change—
driven by technology but bearing substantive social effects
and reflecting a changing conception of the possible—
issues of governance and ethics of AI are becoming sub-
stantially more important, but not necessarily better articu-
lated or understood (Barocas & boyd, 2017; Kitchin, 2014).
This paper reports findings from an interview study
of stakeholders in the field of AI, including lawyers, legal
scholars, policymakers, and government workers, as well
as the designers and researchers directly engaged in AI
development and implementation. From these accounts
of AI successes and failures, we propose the need for a
broader, infrastructurally-informed understanding not
only of the technologies themselves, but also the ways in
which they are implemented, built, understood, and
acted through as a means of building towards more just
and socially positive uses of AI.
2 | BACKGROUND
Popular representations of scientific progress often fail to
adequately account for or represent the nuance of that
progress. Accounts of AI's successes or failures inform
popular understanding of that AI, having significant
influences on legislation and regulation, as well as ‘proto-
type accounts’ of the state of the art for researchers and
scholars as they grapple with issues of ethics and needed
changes to laws and policy. While some systems are pop-
ularly seen to exceed the capacity of humans, with IBM's
Watson being perhaps the most visible example
(Luxton, 2019), others are seen to reinforce existing bias
(Skeem & Lowencamp, 2016), or influence the results of
elections and other political action (Metcalf, 2018).
The tools and infrastructures enabling innovation in
AI do not respond easily to ethics and values inquiry–often
their inner workings are opaque even to the researchers
operating them (Kraus, Perer, & Ng, 2016). Considering AI
from an infrastructural perspective provides unique lever-
age into understanding it not only in the form of a specific
application, but as the most visible extension of an ‘inter-
network’ of data sources, standards, organizations, and
applications. While cyberinfrastructure initially concerned
itself primarily with computational resources (Atkins
et al., 2003), ethnographic research into infrastructure
showed that equal attention must be paid to social factors
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such as group membership, accepted practice, and policy
objects like standards or regulation in order to adequately
account for its reach and effects (Edwards, 2010; Jackson
et al., 2007; Star & Ruhleder, 1996). Infrastructure, in
short, comprises that which supports and subtends a given
activity—in part it comprises the policy, material and sys-
tems that do not need to be reconsidered at the moment of
action (Slota & Bowker, 2017). As such, infrastructure
becomes a relational quality determined in part by the
daily practice and assumptions of availability of a given
group.
There have been standards, frameworks and guidelines
proposed for ethical AI systems (Bryson & Winfield, 2017;
Floridi et al., 2018, Jobin, Ienca, & Vayena, 2019; O'Sullivan
et al. 2019; Winfield, 2019). Such standards are often located
at the design of algorithms and automated learning tech-
niques rather than addressing contingent systems across the
ecosystem of AI, which encompasses data collection, selec-
tion, and curation even before concerns of use and guidance
in how to interpret and respond to algorithmic outputs
(Whittlestone et al., 2019). Professional and technical stan-
dardization is used to reduce professional risk, while provid-
ing constraints on work practice and homologies between
research settings and representations of phenomena
(Fujimura, 1992). For example, engineers earn professional
engineering licenses and use approved design codes. Stan-
dardization allows peers to judge the success and objectivity
of work (Sismondo, 2010). Standards concerned with
values-oriented societal outcomes, such as those for sustain-
ability or fairness, may also be used in this manner, giving
designers and regulators a basis on which to incorporate
these values without being concerned about indefensible
outcomes or processes that could result in liability concerns.
Standards, as they support ongoing work without the need
for reconsideration at the moment of that work, are best
understood infrastructural goods, part of the inter-network
(Slota & Bowker, 2017) that, often in an invisible, occluded
way (Slota, Slaughter, & Bowker, In Press), form and struc-
ture work and the outputs of technology.
However, standards must also be both learned and
interpreted (unlike, for example, the standardized measure-
ment units or physical engineering hardware that are rela-
tively universal [Alder, 1998; O'Connell 1993]). Value
Sensitive Design (Fleischmann, 2014; Friedman, 1996;
Friedman & Kahn, 2002; van den Hoven, 2007) and Values
in Design (Knobel & Bowker, 2011; Nissenbaum, 2001)
provide means for understanding and guiding the technol-
ogy design process according to an understanding of the
implicit and inherent values of a system. While these
methods are effective in exposing and reasoning through
such implicit values, they often present a challenge in
terms of selecting and intentionally building systems that
conform to or replicate those values in practice (Manders-
Huits, 2011), and even in some cases of creating techniques
for translating values into design requirements are pro-
posed, it is with the caveat that the relationship is context-
dependent, and still requires a values and specification
judgement to be made (van de Poel, 2013).
AI is increasingly a distributed, collaborative proposi-
tion, and one that, while becoming more consequential,
is increasingly opaque in terms of its ethics and values.
Standards themselves are designed objects, embedding
and reflecting some set of values of their own. While
understanding and uncovering embedded values in the
design process is a key first step in understanding the
technology itself as well as providing some account of its
consequence, the infrastructure of its data, standards,
policy and legislation also plays a consequential role. The
development of standards and values inquiry often
focuses solely on the designers themselves. Without some
account of the ways in which in the values of systems
designers interact, compare and coincide with the values
of stakeholders elsewhere in the ecology of AI, efforts to
understand and account for the consequence of (or even
the full set of embedded values within) AI provide a less-
complete picture. Understanding the societal conse-
quence of AI relies upon an account not only the
designers of the technology, but at the very least also
those who are involved in designing and implementing
regulations and laws governing these technologies.
The goal of this paper is to better understand the
landscape of the law, regulation, and ethics as it relates
to AI through the experiences and work practices of AI
stakeholders. Specifically, in this paper, we ask: How can
we understand the societal benefits and harms of AI?
3 | METHODS
This paper reports findings from a study in which we
conducted 26 semi-structured interviews with an interdis-
ciplinary group of AI stakeholders drawn from the fields
of AI research, governmental and organizational policy,
and legal research and practice. Here, we define stake-
holders as influencing or being affected by AI (Freeman,
1984), which we further partition into technology stake-
holders involved in designing AI-based technologies, pol-
icy stakeholders involved in the regulation of AI-based
technologies, and legal stakeholders involved in inter-
preting laws in relation to AI. Of these interviews, eight
were conducted with technology stakeholders, 10 with
policy stakeholders, and eight with legal stakeholders.
Potential interviewees were identified according to their
engagement with AI and recruited via e-mail.
We took inspiration from real-time technology assess-
ment (Guston & Sarewitz, 2002), using concrete cases of
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actual technological advances and potential future tech-
nological advances that grounded our interviews, rather
than assuming legal and policy experts have the relevant
technical expertise or are aware of the line between what
is possible and what is not. For the latter, we drew inspi-
ration from value sensitive design (Friedman, Kahn, &
Borning, 2008), particularly the Envisioning Cards
(Friedman & Hendry, 2012), which encourage technology
experts to consider the downstream effects and implica-
tions of the technologies that they create, and to consider
the values of users and others who may be affected by
technologies in the design of those technologies. In this
way, the interview protocol worked to surface embedded
values, elucidate work practice as relevant to negotiating
these values, and account for differences in knowledge
across the three stakeholder groups. We then used the
findings from the technology stakeholder interviews to
select specific cases of technological advances to ground
interviews with policy and legal stakeholders.
Technology development stakeholders were prompted
to consider value tradeoffs (Fleischmann & Wallace, 2010),
stakeholder relationships, and the broader potential ethical
implications of their own work. Based in part on the find-
ings from these interviews, we identified six emerging
applications of AI, including (a) autonomous vehicles,
(b) AI-determined organ transplant priority lists, (c) the
use of AI agents in call centers, (d) AI-determined deci-
sions on bank loans, (e) the use of AI in medical diagnoses
and treatment and (f) the use of AI in informing criminal
sentencing decisions. These emerging applications were
used in the policy and legal stakeholder interviews,
orienting policy and legal interviewees towards technolo-
gies with known scope and capacity. For each scenario, we
prompted legal and policy stakeholders to consider the eth-
ical, legal, and policy ramifications of that technology. All
subjects were also asked to consider the potential conse-
quences of AI in broad adoption in terms of its ethical,
legal, and policy implications.
We employed thematic analysis (Braun &
Clarke, 2006), first coding the data and then inductively
identifying themes across the codes. This analysis
resulted in multiple broad themes. This paper reports
findings related to one of these themes, the attribution of
failures and successes of AI to data quality issues, but we
anticipate publishing future papers on AI ethics as work
as well as how AI reconfigures the relationship between
the individual and the collective.
4 | FINDINGS
Brought to light in these interviews was the role of
accounts of AI's consequences and implications that bear
significant weight in informing how we might better
understand, implement, and legislate public accountabil-
ity in the design and deployment of AI, particularly when
our goal is the development of systems that support socie-
tally beneficial outcomes. One key account was our
stakeholders' depiction of the relationship between the
data used to build AI systems and the outcomes of that
system. The data, especially, was perceived by many to be
substantially out of their control (other than in selection
and collection) and a major limit to what their work was
capable of doing. One technology stakeholder expressed
how what the data expressed was often perceived to be
outside the control of the person doing the design work:
The data is what you got. I mean, [LAUGH],
if the data's biased then your result's gonna
be biased. If the data's not, it won't, right? So
there's some element here beyond, it's
beyond the data scientists that guy or gal
writing machine learning algorithms, right?
It's back to the very data collection itself.
This lack of control at the moment of analysis and
design of AI systems is further emphasized by our inter-
viewees attribution of negative social consequences such
as bias, unfair liability, or reinforcing of unwanted social
conditions as largely unavoidable due to the quality and
coverage of available data. Throughout our interviews
with stakeholders in AI, there was a persistent notion
that negative social outcomes of AI systems can be attrib-
uted, not to the analysis, algorithms or system design, but
to the data itself. In attempting to assess or address socie-
tal outcomes of algorithmic analysis, data quality and
availability was seen as a significant limiting factor in
what designers and researchers in AI systems are able to
do and one that bore substantial consequence as it made
its way into the world. An AI expert stated this quite
succinctly:
As you can imagine, that model is limited to
the data that it processed, the data it was
trained on. That's its entire universe of
knowledge. So if that data set is incomplete
or if it's biased, it's going to result in a biased
result for the end user.
As seen above, both the quantity of data necessary,
and its often siloed, heterogeneous nature was seen as a
significant hurdle in implementing ML in particular.
Some interviewees, such as the technology stakeholder
below, emphasized the need for broader, interoperable
databases in order to achieve desired results in their com-
mercial AI environments.
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And so to accomplish that we need lots and
lots of data. That's one of the big issues of
machine learning, particularly deep learning,
lots of data. And so we have all these internal
silos, different business units that have
databases.
However, complexity in existing analysis, specifi-
cally when adapting AI towards socially positive out-
comes, can also be limited by existing practices. This
becomes not just an issue of data and data quality, but
also of engaging with domains, particularly in their his-
tories of ongoing work. The climate model, in particu-
lar, was described by a technology stakeholder engaged
in AI research as being particularly intractable to
machine learning approaches due not only to the data
itself but also the history of work undertaken within
that domain:
The problem is that most of the data sets
being collected are very small, fragmented,
not necessarily the type that are easy to learn
from. Our climate models have become very,
very, very complicated over the years and
replicating them with machine learning
techniques is actually really difficult.
This notion significantly problematizes standardiza-
tion and regulation efforts that focus on the moment of
algorithmic design itself. Undesirable and biased social
conditions were understood by our interviewees to affect
the data that is available, and this was seen, as expressed
below by a technology stakeholder engaged in commer-
cial research, as making AI itself more applicable and
effective for already-privileged groups:
And I think that the sort of overwhelming
message from deployed machine learning
over the past five years is that it can still
work much, much better. For people who
are in socially advantaged classes like men.
People who are economically well-off, people
with lighter skin and so on, and tend to work
comparatively poorly for groups who are
either under-represented or disadvantaged.
However, these biases in data are often invisible until
after analysis takes place. It is difficult to identify or
account for biased data prior to analysis, and often such
incomplete data coverage remains even after the technol-
ogy is deployed. This was echoed by a legal stakeholder
in AI, where bias became notable as ‘in-built’ on the basis
of available data:
There is latent bias, you see that a lot … Where
the data set that the model is trained on simply
didn't include enough people of particular, for
example, racial heritages and so it doesn't work
very well because they didn't have enough.
And then you can also see bias built in.
And the fact remains that implementations of AI out-
side of the research space often retain those biases.
Researchers and designers might consider them irrelevant
to that application, or impossible to correct. The distance
from control over outputs as expressed above becomes
increasingly problematic as innovation, novelty and being
the first to market become prioritized (especially in com-
mercial contexts) over working with unbiased, well-
covered data sets. Despite the problematization of data
availability, respondents also expressed the notion that
biased, incomplete data might not necessarily negatively
impact the results of research or technology design. One
technology stakeholder in a leadership role of a technology
company referred to some difficulty in assessing how
impactful biased data might be in certain applications - or
even whether that bias might be desirable.
How do we go about making sure our data
isn't biased in some way? Or even deciding,
maybe we've figured out that it's biased but
we decide that that's okay. In our applica-
tion, that doesn't matter. Maybe it matters
very much.
This stakeholder added:
it's possible, because we're selling computers,
that we get our data off our own website and
only technical geeks [LAUGH] like to buy com-
puters. So the very data that we collect is biased.
Not because we're evil people, but because that's
just what happens in the real world, right? Cer-
tain people like to buy our stuff.
However, even among those interviewees who were
aware of algorithmic accountability, and sensitive to stan-
dards for ethical policy design, adequately representing
bias was itself problematic, as expressed by the following
technology stakeholder.
Right now maybe some of the bad effects of
AI that we see, things like biased AI algo-
rithms that demonstrate sort of racist or gen-
derist sort of biases. I guess maybe it's just an
outcome - we don't have the tools to
express that.
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And the representation of that idea was perceived as
quite important, especially when discussions of regula-
tion and the legal implications of the outcomes of AI
occurred. While those working directly in the design pro-
cess were aware of the limits both of their algorithms and
the data that they used, they lack control of how those
results are perceived, and even whether those limitations
would be communicated or discussed once the designed
system made its way to an end-user or the results became
publicized. One interviewee related their experience in
writing a paper intended for the security community that
expressed some shared narratives of unexpected out-
comes of algorithmic analysis and itself gained media
attention and found traction outside of the initially
intended community. Upon collecting and publishing
these stories, with a goal of representing that knowledge
that “didn't fit the narrative,” of the scientific process, this
interviewee found their paper gaining significant traction
outside of the original intended community, including
public media.
And I guess kind of, because the paper's been
amplified in the media, it's had some diffuse
effect there. And the media sometimes dis-
torts things and so it could be unclear
whether the message has gotten through in
the way that we intended.
While this interviewee was generally positive about
the reception and potential influence of the paper, they
were still concerned about distortion and misrepresenta-
tion once it moved to other contexts, was drawn upon by
other communities. Hype, as it emerges as a theme in our
analysis, thus expresses not just an ill-informed, future-
oriented representation of the potential for a technology
or the results of research, nor a breathless prediction of
the future, but in general the notion that outcomes of AI
are often distorted as they leave the immediate commu-
nity for which it they were intended. This interviewee
was made very aware of public perception of their
research and design work, and became quite concerned
with how it was represented.
Things that they said that were very precise
statements kind of got taken out of context …
I assumed that people would always read the
full paper and get the full context. They want
to cherry pick certain lines, and that's what
happens in the real world, so I wasn't super
prepared for that.
The “messiness” of incompatible understandings of
the capacity of AI between those working with it more
directly and those receiving information outside of the
context of that direct work was seen by many inter-
viewees, including the technology stakeholder below.
There's also the negative impact of, because
different media end users are more or less
going to, are going to more or less distort the
message as some academic thing, more or
less. There's some false ideas that are going
out as a result as well, so kind of messy.
This quote presents an interesting contrast to the
accounts presented by the designers of technology them-
selves of the successes and failures of their systems.
While they understood biased results arising from their
own work as resulting from nuanced issues of data cover-
age and the presence of unexpected outcomes in algorith-
mic design, their perception of the publicity of those
results was often oriented towards media figures and
popular press misunderstanding. In particular it was
media hype of the type mentioned in the above quote
that was seen as misleading. And this distortion created
an interesting parallel to the expressed incompleteness or
lack of coverage of the data itself. Much as outcomes of
AI were seen as escaping the control of the designers due
to incomplete, biased, or inaccurate data, the perceptions
of those outcomes were similarly perceived as outside of
the control of designers and researchers. A technology
stakeholder working in the field of autonomous vehicles
explicitly called out this lack of control as needing some
form of address.
I guess, one place I'm curious about, I'm not
sure what could be done better or worse, is
the interface between research and the
media. There's a lack of control there. I'm
not sure what sort of intervention could
be done.
This interface between media and research, especially
in conveying and representing an accurate understanding
of these results was perceived as consequential. A legal
stakeholder drew a connection between the representa-
tion the media hype of AI (in a negative sense as ‘fear-
mongering’) and legal consequences:
If you look at first of all the fear-mongering
that's going on regarding Artificial Intelli-
gence and all of the disinformation out there,
and you look also at the few laws that were
adopted, it seems that the burden is being
put more on the AI users, and when I say
user, I mean the companies that will actually
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buy AI solutions and incorporate them into
their products.
The above quote raises a particularly salient issue:
technology and scientific experts, while they have a role
in law and policy formation (Jasanoff, 2004) are not the
only means by which the public and policymakers under-
stand technology. Negative media coverage and incom-
plete or inaccurate representations of results or process
might create unrealistic expectations on the part of the
public (or even students entering the field), and contrib-
ute to placing the burden of accountability on users that
have little control of issues like biased or incomplete
data, and fail to sufficiently account for the process by
which outcomes of AI come to be. A technology stake-
holder mentioned the negative consequence such media
hype might have on the field of machine learning itself:
My most negative concern is that people
have over hyped what machine learning and
what artificial intelligence can do. I've read a
lot of pop science articles on, The develop-
ment of, what do they call it? Artificial gen-
eral intelligence. And I've seen a lot of
grandiose claims. And I think a lot of those
projects are kinda bound to fail. And if they
succeed that's great. It would have a huge
impact, but they might fail. In terms of the
machine learning space, I think when people
start pointing to these failures, they're gonna
grow cold on the things that machine learn-
ing can actually achieve which again, I think
that's a lot.
In this, we see another factor impacting the social
consequence of AI—that of its popular understanding,
and the generally available knowledge of what its capa-
bilities and capacity might be. Hype pushes the discourse
of ML/AI towards unrealistic questions, and popular rep-
resentations in the media might relocate responsibility to
those with less control of the outcomes. We perceive this
as a problem of the socialization of AI—here conceived
as the availability and pervasiveness of an infrastructure
by which AI might be publicly understood, evaluated,
and held accountable. A well-socialized technology is one
that is consistently represented, where sufficient implicit
knowledge exists that misrepresentation is relatively visi-
ble, and misunderstandings can be more readily
corrected. More specifically, the socialization of technol-
ogy speaks to its visibility and in shared understandings
of its role. And the lack of socialization can be problem-
atic, with interpretability being of central concern to the
users of that technology, as the below legal stakeholder
states with respect to issues of liability as learning-based
expert systems find their way into high-risk applications
like medicine.
I think that you will see claims that the AI
was mistaken, so any time a person is
injured through a medical procedure, they
have the possibility of asserting malpractice.
And you start to raise questions of was the
clinician competent to rely on the AI, AI can
be a complex technology to understand. And
if you do not understand how the model was
trained and what the target of the model is,
it can easily be misunderstood and mis-
applied potentially resulting in human inju-
ries and of course losses.
As seen in the following quote from a legal stake-
holder, how AI is framed and understood popularly can
not only provide unrealistic views of the capacity of AI,
but also limit and structure where they might understand
ethical impacts to occur.
Unfortunately, for most people, AI is framed
for them by Hollywood. And they think Ter-
minator, and various movies, and they think
general artificial intelligence. And that drives
a lot of the thinking and conversation
around ethics. No one would say, hey, we've
really got to have an ethical program in
Microsoft Word, it's a piece of software, the-
re's no sentience. The reality of AI today is,
there is no sentience … So we really need to
understand what we're talking about, as we
start to think about things like education.
And it's sort of, everyone needs to under-
stand what the technology is, in order to
develop a rational educational framework.
The stakeholder above, in talking about how a “ratio-
nal educational framework” might be put into place,
clearly elucidates the need for better socialization of AI
even prior to educational interventions. When ‘sentience’
or some other criteria becomes a dividing factor between
where values and ethics ought and ought not to be con-
sidered in system, the implicit values and societal impacts
of those technologies that fall on the ‘ought not’ side of
that criteria are occluded, and potential mitigations of
negative impacts may remain unconsidered. Algorithmic
operation cannot be fully understood as separate from
the data on which it operates, neither can data be consid-
ered as separate or distinct from its representation, analy-
sis, and deployment. Apparent neutrality of technology is
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produced through limited representation—all technology
is sociality as well as design, and an effective understand-
ing of the societal impact or consequence of technology
requires a similar understanding of how it is socialized,
regulated, and used.
5 | DISCUSSION
What do our findings tell us about how to understand the
societal benefits and harms of AI, specifically in terms of
maximizing benefits and minimizing harms? There is no
such thing as truly objective or neutral design—even very
mundane objects can be shown to embody some set of
values and play vital social roles (Latour, 1992;
Winner, 1980). The lack of control over outcomes
expressed by our interview subjects indicates that it is not
just data, or algorithms, or implementation, rather a con-
nected, complex view of their interactions are necessary
for a better understanding of the social ethical conse-
quence of a system. While data was often pointed to as a
key factor in biased or otherwise flawed applications of
AI, this evidence also indicated that better data will not
necessarily result in a more ethically sound system. Pub-
lic interpretations of the capacity and action of the sys-
tem will play in a role in how it is regulated, understood
and funded. Systems with ‘perfect data’ for their intended
purpose might still be misused or misunderstood, and
their potentially positive effects undermined.
Our interviews revealed a very close conceptual rela-
tionship between the outcomes of AI and the specific
data sources used to inform its development. Much as
early expert systems and other applications of symbolic
AI required a close engagement with the domains and
experts that they are intended to serve (Ribes
et al., 2019), our technology stakeholders engaged with
modern, learning-oriented and algorithmically-driven AI
considered data not only as a resource but also as a key
determining factor in the effectiveness and outcomes of
AI both in research and in implementation outside of
research contexts.
In our interviewees' common attributions of negative
social outcomes of algorithmic analysis to problematic
data, it might seem that better data would be the solution
to producing better, more ethically sound systems. How-
ever, it is often difficult to control the outcomes of tech-
nology design and implementation even when attention
is paid to the embedded values, ethical standards and reg-
ulation of AI. Very visible outcomes, like IBM's Watson's
run on Jeopardy, or the ability to use social data (often
illicitly obtained) to broadly influence elections based on
models of human behavior (Metcalf, 2018) often fail to
represent or account for the process and operation by
which those results were obtained. These influential,
incomplete representations and implementations of AI
exceed the control and contextualization of their
designers. We have chosen to refer to this as hype in
order to both make use of the members' meanings
(Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, 1995) of the term and
emphasize the expressed distance between the designers'
understandings of their technology and the ways in they
saw that technology being perceived and expressed in the
larger public sphere.
The findings presented in this paper point towards
the need for an ecological, infrastructural understanding
of AI as being necessary to effectively assess or mitigate
its potential social effects. A question often raised in dis-
cussions of transparency or accountability of algorithms
is ‘transparency for whom?, accountable to whom?’
(Ananny, 2016; Kemper & Kolkman, 2019; Kroll et al.,
2016). Moreover, what is needed is not just an infrastruc-
tural view of the ethical and societal ramifications of AI,
but also infrastructures of social good. Building socially
good AI was often cast in our interviews as somewhat
outside of the purview of the technology stakeholders
involved in its development, and similarly a lack of full
understanding of a given “mode” or implementation of
AI was pointed to by policy and legal stakeholders as
(mis)apportioning responsibility for the outcomes of that
technology or being significant limiting factors in poten-
tial societal good that they might produce. Occluded,
marginalized, or embedded aspects of policy, technology,
and society bear consequence in terms of which human
values the system supports, enacts, or challenges—even
in what might seem to be relatively ancillary aspects of
that technology like terms of service agreements (Slota,
Slaughter, & Bowker, In Press). As such, building an ethi-
cally good AI system is an exercise in building and
exploring infrastructure, not only to better understand
how a negative or positive societal outcome might come
to be in the confluence of data, analysis, implementation
and regulation, but also in providing a means of under-
standing AI accurately in terms of its scope, capacity, and
potential limitations.
The socialization of AI is not limited to the educa-
tional framework and availability of knowledge, but
rather encompasses the broader set of systems, policies,
and standards that render the social outcomes of AI
available to regulation, tractable to policymakers and the
public at large, and the shared vocabularies and under-
standings that can limit the negative effects of incomplete
representations of that data. An example of a well-
socialized technology might be that of the automobile.
While the design and manufacturing process of a given
vehicle might not be immediately available knowledge to
a large group of people, the responsibilities of drivers and
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manufacturers are relatively well-understood and
accepted, and infrastructure exists to maintain, ensure
the safety of, and support their operation. Necessary
infrastructural goods like fuel are present, standards
(though themselves living and changing) are present and
enforced, and the broad strokes of the required knowl-
edge and competencies to make safe and effective use of
the technology are established and fairly consistent.
While some might claim widespread driving is itself a
social negative, that judgment call varies widely—more
importantly to this is the notion that should a person
choose to drive or build a car there is an accessible,
supported, and maintained means by which they might
understand their responsibilities, liabilities, and require-
ments for safe operation.
A prescriptive ethics of AI may not be the immediate
goal in seeking social good and ethically responsible uses
of that technology. Rather, a means by which an effec-
tive, informed discussion on what is ethical or unethical
in the uses of AI is a necessary prior step, and one that
(especially given the presence of hype and its potential
impacts on policy and regulation) cannot take place
solely in the academy.
6 | LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
This exploratory study helped us to identify both findings
and limitations. First, our interview group was largely
self-selected, and likely was self-selected towards those
stakeholders who already had some interest in the ethics
or values of AI systems, given the time requirement and
lack of compensation. Second, as an interview-driven
study, we did not directly examine code, nor did we
deeply explore research or work practices in situ, and
largely took our interviewees accounts of their work at
face value. Third, while our approach was effective in
eliciting responses informed by an effective understand-
ing of the capacity of our chosen AI technologies for our
legal and policy stakeholders, as well as sensitizing our
technology stakeholders to issues of values, ethics, law,
and policy, this approach had limited impact beyond our
immediate studied population.
Future research could potentially engage with a wider
population of stakeholders through more lightweight
methods. For example, surveys could be distributed via
professional societies to gain an understanding of how
these findings could apply to the broader community of
legal, policy and technology stakeholders of AI. Our
study design also revealed significant opportunities for
research that more directly engages with work and
research practice through participant ethnography, real-
time technology assessment (Guston & Sarewitz, 2002),
or participatory design activities. Finally, the techniques
we developed to coordinate understanding between our
stakeholder groups could inform the development of edu-
cational and training interventions that could be adopted
to do so on a larger scale.
7 | CONCLUSION
We started with the question, how can we understand
the societal benefits and harms of AI? Our participants
revealed a broad picture of responsibility and agency in
the impact of AI, that extended beyond the research into
and design of AI, its regulation, and relevant legal struc-
tures. Understanding how some outcome came to be
requires an understanding of the full lifecycle of the tech-
nology that gave rise to the outcome, from data collec-
tion, curation and selection, all the way to how that
system comes to be represented and understood in the
media. In similar ways, policy responses to and the regu-
lation of AI likely will be significantly limited in effective-
ness without a full accounting of the infrastructure that
subtends the work of AI. While there exist a wide array
of current efforts to standardize, provide design direction,
and coordinate research and implementation work
towards more socially positive outcomes of AI, these
often tend to place responsibility and accountability for
those outcomes at the moment of design, or at the end
user of the system.
Data-driven AI, especially when heterogeneous data
sets are collated and leveraged towards learning applica-
tions, significantly complexifies the agency of the
designer or user of a given AI system in terms of its
potential outcomes. In addition to the quality, quantity,
and coverage of data, and the media representations of
the capacity and potential of a given application of AI,
there still exists a landscape of regulation, extant stan-
dards, professional expectations, and design affordances
that all contribute to how AI is used and what its impact
might be. In order to build good systems, there needs to
exist an infrastructure through which the impact and eth-
ical valence of the ecosystem of AI might be effectively
understood.
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